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# To what extent are EU Member States economically dependent on Russia?

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Economic interdependence between countries is considered to be something that forces the partners involved to cooperate with each other, and thus is seen to aid in maintaining peace between the parties. The European Economic Community was founded and based on this philosophy some 60 years ago. The pan-European peacekeeping mission has also been one of the key drivers behind the logic to build intensive economic ties between the EU and Russia. As a result of this mission, some 50 per cent of Russia's foreign trade was conducted with the EU in the period January–June 2014 despite the contemporary Cold Peace era prevailing between the parties (Customs Russia 2014). In turn, Russia's share of the EU's external trade is 9.5 per cent, making Russia the EU's third-largest trade partner after the USA and China (European Commission 2014a).

The EU Member States differ significantly in terms of their economic dependence on Russia. The countries in the EU-Russia border zone are clearly the most dependent on trade with Russia. EU countries in general conduct less than five per cent of their foreign trade with Russia, but in the border zone the trade dependence on Russia is substantially higher, with the exception of Romania. Geographical proximity and business rationality explain a part of this high trade dependence with Russia, but on the other hand, one should not neglect the impact of historical and political reasons when assessing the reasons for the overemphasised trade dependence of the border zone countries with Russia (Map 1 and Appendix 1).

Trade dependence on Russia becomes even more varied when one excludes EU trade from the EU countries' foreign trade. We can take Finland as an example. Russia makes up 13.9 per cent of Finland's foreign trade turnover. However, if EU trade is excluded, Russia's share jumps to 31.6 per cent. In other words, Finland is over three times more dependent on trade with Russia than the EU on average (Customs Finland 2014; European Commission

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2014a). If one took Lithuania as another example, it would become clear that Lithuania is approximately six times more dependent on trade with Russia than the EU on average, since 57.4 per cent of Lithuania's foreign trade is conducted with Russia if trade with EU countries is excluded (Statistics Lithuania 2014; European Commission 2014a).




See Appendix 1 for data.

**Map 1.** EU Member States' dependence on trade with Russia
(share of Russian trade in overall foreign trade turnover of EU Member States)

Source: National Statistics.

The majority of imports into the EU from Russia consist of various energy-related goods, such as oil, oil products, natural gas, coal and uranium. Due to the massive energy imports from Russia, roughly a fifth of the EU's primary energy needs are met by Russian energy. To be more precise, Russian oil forms some 9–11 per cent, Russian natural gas some 5–6 per cent, Russian uranium 2–3 per cent and Russian coal 2–3 per cent of the EU's primary energy needs. The EU is far more dependent on energy imports from Russia than, for instance, China and the USA. The overall dependence of China and the USA on Russian energy is some 2–3 per cent.

The dependence on energy imports from Russia varies a great deal between EU countries. Let me take Russian natural gas as an example. Cyprus and Malta do not consume natural gas at all; therefore they cannot be dependent on Russian gas either. Sweden is comparable to Cyprus and Malta, as the Swedish economy's gas dependence is marginal. Moreover, all of Sweden's gas is imported from Denmark. Contrary to this, Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK are heavily dependent on gas but they either produce the gas that they use or they import their gas from elsewhere, i.e. not from Russia. The Baltic States and Finland are extreme cases, as they import 100 per cent of their gas from

Russia[1], but despite this, their real dependence on Russian gas varies a lot, as gas plays a different role in these economies. For example in Estonia and Finland, only around nine per cent of the primary energy needs are met by natural gas, whereas the corresponding share in Latvia is over 25 per cent and in Lithuania over 35 per cent. As a whole, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia are by far the most dependent on Russian gas in the EU (Map 2 and Appendix 2).




See Appendix 2 for data.

**Map 2.** EU Member States' dependence on Russian natural gas in 2012
(share of Russian gas in primary energy consumption of EU Member States)

Source: Eurogas (2013).

The EU Member States' dependence on Russian consumption, i.e. dependence on Russia as an export market, varies massively in terms of (1) the absolute value of the exports to Russia, (2) the relative importance of Russia in the overall exports, and (3) the structure of exports to Russia.

Germany alone covered over a quarter of the whole of the EU's exports to Russia in the first half of 2014. Germany is followed by Italy (11%), France (9%), the UK (6%) and Poland (6%). These five countries represent some 60 per cent of the EU's exports to Russia (Customs Russia 2014). Despite the lion's share held by these countries, they have remained united when it comes to the EU's sanctions policy against Russia. Louder complaints about and criticism of the EU's sanction policy have been voiced in other countries, such as Fin-

[1] Lithuania and Poland are to complete the construction process of their first LNG receiving terminals by the end of 2014. These LNG projects have a notable impact on the reduction of gas import dependence from Russia in these countries (Liuhto 2014).

land, where exports to Russia play a larger role in their total exports. In Finland, some business people have actively lobbied against the EU's sanctions policies despite the fact that Finland is less dependent on exports to Russia than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Perhaps the explanation for such a behavioural difference can be found in these countries' histories, i.e. all the Baltic States were a part of the Soviet Union, whereas Finland managed to stay outside the Soviet bloc after the Second World War. The Baltic States seem to have a fresher understanding of Russia through their Soviet-era experience than Finland, which does not always seem to fully comprehend the potential threat of being too dependent on Russia.

According to the European Commission (2014a), the EU's most dependent sector on exports to Russia is footwear and hats. 16 per cent of these commodities' exports outside the EU are directed at Russia. This is followed by live animals (14%), vegetable products (13%), textiles (11%), plastics products (9%), stone, glass and ceramics (9%), machinery (9%), pulp and paper (8%), foodstuffs (8%), transport equipment (7%) and chemical products (7%).

If one moves from trade to investments, one can easily see that Russian direct investment in the EU plays a minor role. In the majority of the EU Member States, Russian direct investment represents less than one per cent of their inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock. Russia's share exceeds the 1 per cent level in only seven EU countries, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania. Its share is close to five per cent in Austria, Bulgaria and the Baltic States, whereas in Finland it is just slightly above one per cent. Cyprus tops the list with a share of nearly 15 per cent.

Oil and gas-related business activities are behind the majority of Russian investments in the EU, though Russian companies have expanded to other industries as well, such as the metal business, logistics and tourism. Russian corporations have been relatively reluctant to start manufacturing activities in the EU, though a few exceptions can be found (Liuhto and Majuri 2014).

If one wishes to analyse the overall impact of Russian investments in the EU, one should first take into account the fact that a lot of Russian capital in the EU has arrived via tax havens. In addition to these indirect investments from Russia, one should also consider the CypRUS phenomenon. According to the Central Bank of Russia (2014), Russian companies had invested approximately EUR 150 billion as FDI in Cyprus by the end of 2013. The Central Bank of Cyprus in turn reported that the country has received only some EUR 2 billion from Russia as FDI (Liuhto and Majuri 2014).

One may assume that a great part of the Russian capital invested in Cyprus has left the country and either gone back to Russia or it has been reinvested somewhere else in the EU. Therefore, I surmise that the real amount of Russian FDI in the EU is much larger than national statistics indicate. On the other hand, it seems that EU statistics overestimate the total amount of Russian FDI in the EU[2]. Whatever the true amount of Russian investment in

[2] According to EU statistics, the EU's inward FDI stock from Russia was some €75 billion in 2012 (European Commission 2014b). If one compares the aforementioned amount with the figures presented in Appendix 3, a major gap between them can be observed. I am not able to explain the reasons for the substantial statistical difference, but

the EU is, it seems evident that the Russian FDI stock in the EU is not at such a high level that the EU as a whole should be concerned about it. Despite this, one should not forget that in some sectors, such as energy logistics and energy trading, Russian companies may play a strategic role. This becomes particularly evident in some ex-socialist countries within the EU (Map 3 and Appendix 3).




See Appendix 3 for data.

**Map 3.** EU Member States' dependence on Russian direct investment
(share of Russian investment in the inward FDI stock of EU Member States)

Source: Liuhto and Majuri (2014).

To summarise, it is practically impossible to calculate the exact economic dependence of the EU Member States on Russia, as the business processes and their spill-over effects are very complex. Let me take Finland again as an example. Finland imports some 15 million tonnes of crude oil from Russia. After the refining process, half of it is used in Finland, while the other half is exported (Öljyalan keskusliitto 2014). That is why over a tenth of Finland's total exports consist of oil products, though the country does not produce any oil itself (Customs Finland 2014). Should one interpret the processing of Russian oil and reselling it to the West as a sign of dependence on Russia or as a sign of an intelligent business idea? This question applies to Lithuania as well.

Even if it is impossible to precisely measure the real economic dependence on Russia, one can make an educated guess. As a result, one can argue that the EU-Russia border zone, i.e. the EU countries from Finland to Romania, is generally more dependent on Russia than

one might guess that the European Commission may have tried to take into account the indirect investment flows from Russia in their statistics.

the rest of the EU. There are a few exceptions, such as Austria, which has had historically close political ties with the Soviet Union. Cyprus is the second exception to the general rule as it seems to be highly dependent on investment flows from Russia. It is hard to predict for how long the CypRUS phenomenon will last, since the Cypriot capital gateway was created prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Prior to Cyprus' EU membership, Russian investors were motivated by the country's low taxation levels, flexible legislation and visa freedom offered to Russian citizens. Things started to change since Cyprus' membership in the EU, and the financial crisis of 2008–2009 was a major blow to its national credibility, as Russian investors were forced to wait for a relatively long time before they were able to withdraw their funds out of Cypriot banks.

To conclude, when one compares the economic interdependence between the EU and Russia, it is an indisputable fact that the EU, which has an economy that is ten times larger than Russia's, is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on the EU. Russia's large energy deliveries to the EU are perhaps the only thing that makes the EU truly dependent on Russia. It is wise to keep in mind that roughly a fifth of the EU's primary energy needs are met with various forms of Russian energy. To put it another way, over 100 million EU citizens' households are run by Russian energy. In the EU-Russia border zone, dependence on Russian energy is considerably higher. For instance, half of Finland's energy needs are met with Russian energy. In the Baltic States and some other ex-socialist states, Russia's share climbs even higher than Finland's. Besides the dependence on Russian energy, one should analyse vulnerability levels in case of a Russian energy cut-off. For example, Finland is well prepared for a complete stop in energy deliveries from Russia, which is not the case with all ex-Warsaw Pact countries that are now EU Member States. In fact, some of them would be extremely vulnerable as a result of any non-delivery of Russian energy during the winter months.

Therefore, one should add two components to the analysis of economic dependence on Russia, i.e. vulnerability levels and timing. In the long-term, Russia is clearly more dependent on the EU than vice versa, but in the short term, and during the winter in particular, the EU's easternmost countries are more dependent on Russia than Russia is on them. In order to improve the situation, the EU in general and the eastern EU Member States in particular should reduce their dependence on Russian energy. Even if the transformation from energy collaboration towards other forms of cooperation may take time, the reduction of energy dependence on Russia is a necessary step to normalise EU-Russia relations, since energy is too political and too strategic a commodity on which to form a sustainable foundation for future economic relations between the EU and Russia.

In order to create alternative bridges between the EU and Russia, the parties should develop non-political forms of cooperation together that would benefit both sides. An example of such cooperation could be collaboration between small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), which have a common language, 'money', and are not political actors, unlike oligarchs, who by definition carry political underwear. I am convinced that the SME cooperation would boost EU-Russia trade and investment, and furthermore they would make both parties more competitive and more flexible, and therefore SME cooperation would make them better prepared for the next round of turbulence in the global economy. Furthermore, SMEs are considered to be the cradle of the middle class, which in turn is regarded to be a core ingredient for democracy. Therefore, it is understandable why the development of the SME sector in Russia is important for creating a truly sustainable bridge between the EU and Russia.

Besides SME cooperation, one could name environmental and university collaboration, since both parties would benefit from a clean environment and the training of a new generation of experts, who would not carry the same prejudices as the Cold War era experts. The role of student exchange will become even more emphasised in the future, since nationalist sentiments are gaining strength everywhere in Europe. In addition to educating future decision-makers, one should pay more attention to the free movement of people between the EU and Russia. It is a highly inappropriate time to seriously discuss EU-Russia visa freedom, but it is good to note that one could reach the same goal by extending the tenure of the multiple visa to five years. As I hold a five-year passport, a five-year multiple visa would in practice mean visa freedom for me as well as millions of other EU citizens, as long as we behave within the law in Russia so as to get our Russian visas renewed. I would also like to enhance cultural collaboration, since Russia is a European superpower of culture. I am sure that EU politicians and citizens would be more ready to become dependent on the products of Repin, Tchaikovsky and Tolstoy than those of Gazprom, Rosatom and Rosneft.

I would like to end this article with some common wisdom, which says that it is easy to go to war but it is difficult to leave it, and almost impossible to forget it. This wisdom is applicable to the prevailing sanctions of war between the EU and Russia. In my opinion, we should not isolate Russia or push it towards the unpredictable hands of China, since that would mean the beginning of the end of the domination of Western values around the world. I feel it is appropriate to finish this article with the words of US writer Thomas Merton, who once wrote: "Peace demands the most heroic labor and the most difficult sacrifice. It demands greater heroism than war. It demands greater fidelity to the truth and a much more perfect purity of conscience."

But are Merton's noble thoughts able to guide the EU and Russia through the Ukrainian crisis and beyond? We should remember that there are at least three levels to the Ukrainian crisis: (1) stopping the separatist activity in eastern Ukraine; (2) solving the Crimean situation in line with international law; and (3) developing a long-term strategy for Ukraine.

Even if the federal governance model is not an ideal solution for Ukraine's future stability, it nevertheless may offer Ukraine a way through the acute crisis. Russia's actions towards Ukraine in the approaching winter will determine whether this option is available. If Russia decides to attempt to destabilise Ukraine with gas cut-offs or other means, the EU should harden its sanctions policy towards Russia. The decision on the EU's embargo in terms of its relations with Russia is not actual at the moment, but the EU should consider that option if the military campaign of the separatists in eastern Ukraine does not come to a full stop by next summer.

Although I do not have a judicial education, it is easy to predict that the solving of the Crimean situation in line with international law will be a long and complicated task. I am afraid that the annexation of the Crimea into the Russian Federation has left such a deep wound in EU-Russian relations that Russia's current leadership is unable to cure. One may even argue that the annexation of the Crimea into Russia has created Cold Peace in EU-Russian relations. The following table was designed by Sergei Medvedev back in 2006, and therefore it is understandable that the table does not have even darker scenarios, such as a Cold War, a split in EU-Russian relations or even war (Table 1).

**Table 1**

Alternative future scenarios in EU-Russian relations



| RUSSIA ⇨<br>EUROPE ⇩ | Liberal Modernisation | Authoritarian Modernisation | Bureaucratic Capitalism |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Actor | Partnership | *Zastoi* | *Zastoi* |
| Common Market Plus | Partnership | *Zastoi* | *Zastoi* |
| Fortress Europe | Combination improbable | Cold Peace | Cold Peace |



Note: *Zastoi* means stagnation. The author of this article has added the coloured circles in the table.

Source: Medvedev (2006).

When we aim to predict Ukraine's long-term path, we should not forget that only a fully democratic Russia would allow Ukraine to integrate fully into the Western structures as Ukraine is historically, economically, militarily and politically more important to Russia than we can understand here in the West. The collapse of the Russian Federation would open up another alternative for Ukraine's full integration with the West. Although the disintegration of the Russian Federation may seem a hypothetical option at the moment, one cannot completely exclude it, if Russia chooses stagnation and nationalism as its future path instead of comprehensive modernisation (Figure 1).

In other words, Ukraine's Western orientation depends to a great extent on the internal development of Russia. In turn, Ukraine's Eastern orientation (Ukraine's relationship with the Eurasian Union) depends on the internal development of Ukraine, i.e. the development of the competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy, the credibility of the Ukrainian army and the unity of the Ukrainian political elite. If Ukraine is unable to learn from its history between 1991 and 2014, Russia will most probably seduce or even force Ukraine into its sphere of interest.




**Figure 1.** A future scenario for Russia, if the country's modernisation fails

Patience is a virtue at the moment, but while being patient, we should prepare ourselves for an undesirable future in case Ukraine becomes more unstable in the coming winter. Several EU countries, including Finland, have already decided to increase their defence budgets due to the Ukrainian crisis. Despite this increase, Russia's military spending in relation to the country's economic size is clearly much higher than the military budgets of the EU Member States. Russia spends between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent of its GDP on its military. In the EU, the corresponding figure is less than two per cent (Pires 2012; SIPRI 2014).

**Appendix 1**

EU Member States' dependence on trade with Russia in 2013, unless otherwise indicated in the table (share of Russian trade in overall foreign trade turnover of EU Member States)

| | Value of exports (€ billion) | Russia's share (%) | Value of imports (€ billion) | Russia's share (%) | Foreign trade turnover (€ billion) | Russia's share (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 125.8 | 2.8 | 130.7 | 2.4 | 256.5 | 2.6 |
| Belgium | 353.5 | 1.4 | 339.4 | 2.9 | 692.9 | 2.2 |
| Bulgaria (2012) | 20.7 | 2.7 | 25.4 | 20.8 | 46.1 | 12.7 |
| Croatia | 9.6 | 2.9 | 16.5 | 4.5 | 26.1 | 3.9 |
| Cyprus (2012) | 1.6 | 1.6 | 4.8 | 1.2 | 6.4 | 1.3 |
| Czech Republic | 122.2 | 3.7 | 108.6 | 5.4 | 230.8 | 4.5 |
| Denmark | 83.1 | 1.7 | 73.5 | 2.5 | 156.6 | 2.1 |
| Estonia | 12.3 | 11.4 | 13.6 | 5.8 | 25.9 | 8.5 |
| Finland | 55.9 | 9.6 | 58.2 | 18.1 | 114.1 | 13.9 |
| France | 443.9 | 1.7 | 500.9 | 2.1 | 944.8 | 1.9 |
| Germany | 1093.8 | 3.3 | 896.2 | 4.5 | 1990.0 | 3.8 |
| Greece | 22.5 | No data | 39.8 | No data | 62.3 | No data |
| Hungary | 81.7 | 5.6 | 74.7 | 8.6 | 156.4 | 7.1 |
| Ireland | 86.9 | 0.7 | 49.6 | 0.3 | 136.5 | 0.6 |
| Italy | 389.8 | 2.8 | 359.4 | 5.6 | 749.2 | 4.1 |
| Latvia (2012) | 9.9 | 11.4 | 12.5 | 9.4 | 22.4 | 10.3 |
| Lithuania | 24.6 | 19.8 | 26.2 | 28.1 | 50.8 | 24.1 |
| Luxembourg | 10.6 | 1.5 | 18.2 | 0.0 | 28.8 | 0.6 |
| Malta | 3.9 | 1.2 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 9.6 | 3.5 |
| Netherlands | 433.1 | 1.6 | 386.4 | 5.3 | 819.5 | 3.4 |
| Poland (2012) | 143.5 | 5.4 | 154.0 | 14.0 | 297.5 | 9.9 |
| Portugal | 47.3 | 0.6 | 56.9 | 1.8 | 104.2 | 1.2 |
| Romania | 49.6 | 2.8 | 55.3 | 4.3 | 104.8 | 3.6 |
| Slovakia (2012) | 64.4 | 4.0 | 60.1 | 10.2 | 124.4 | 7.0 |
| Slovenia | 21.6 | 4.7 | 22.2 | 2.0 | 43.8 | 3.4 |
| Spain | 234.2 | 1.2 | 250.2 | 3.3 | 484.4 | 2.3 |
| Sweden | 118.0 | 2.2 | 112.4 | 4.4 | 230.4 | 3.2 |
| United Kingdom* | 199.6 | 2.6 | 200.9 | 3.5 | 400.5 | 3.0 |

* Figures for the United Kingdom are in British pounds.

Source: National Statistics.

**Appendix 2**

EU Member States' dependence on Russian natural gas in 2012 (%)
(share of Russian gas in primary energy consumption of EU Member States)

| | Share of natural gas in primary energy consumption | Share of Russian natural gas in overall natural gas supply | Share of Russian natural gas in primary energy consumption |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 22.0 | 60.1 | 13.2 |
| Belgium | 24.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Bulgaria | 13.0 | 88.9 | 11.6 |
| Croatia | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cyprus | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Czech Republic | 16.1 | 57.5 | 9.3 |
| Denmark | 19.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Estonia | 9.1 | 100,0 | 9.1 |
| Finland | 8.6 | 100,0 | 8.6 |
| France | 14.7 | 16.0 | 2.4 |
| Germany | 21.5 | 37.3 | 8.0 |
| Greece | 13.9 | 55.6 | 7.7 |
| Hungary | 30.1 | 79.9 | 24.0 |
| Ireland | 29.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 35.7 | 28.9 | 10.3 |
| Latvia | 26.7 | 100,0 | 26.7 |
| Lithuania | 36.5 | 100,0 | 36.5 |
| Luxembourg | 24.4 | 24.1 | 5.9 |
| Malta | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Netherlands | 41.8 | 5.2 | 2.2 |
| Poland | 13.9 | 58.6 | 8.1 |
| Portugal | 17.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Romania | 34.3 | 24.3 | 8.3 |
| Slovakia | 26.3 | 83.5 | 22.0 |
| Slovenia | 10.0 | 60.2 | 6.0 |
| Spain | 22.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Sweden | 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| UK | 32.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| EU | 23.1 | 24.2 | 5.6 |

Source: Eurogas (2013).

**Appendix 3**

EU Member States' dependence on Russian direct investment in 2013, unless otherwise indicated in the table (share of Russian investment in the inward FDI stock of EU Member States)

| | Total inward FDI stock of host country (million) | Total Russian FDI stock in host country (million) | Russia's share (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | EUR220,108 | EUR10,436 | 4.7 |
| Belgium (2012) | EUR597,984 | No host data available | – |
| Bulgaria | EUR38,157 | EUR1,818 | 4.8 |
| Croatia | EUR27,020 | EUR240 | 0.9 |
| Cyprus (2012) | EUR15,952 | EUR2,198 | 13.8 |
| Czech Republic | EUR103,455 | EUR311 | 0.3 |
| Denmark (2012) | DKK 788,200 | DKK 3,700 | 0.5 |
| Estonia | EUR15,882 | EUR843 | 5.3 |
| Finland | EUR73,459 | EUR842 | 1.1 |
| France | EUR531,800 | EUR600 | 0.1 |
| Germany (2012) | EUR792,763 | EUR3,226 | 0.4 |
| Greece | EUR20,115 | No host data available | – |
| Hungary (2012) | EUR78,488 | EUR27 | 0.0 |
| Ireland | EUR257,513 | No host data available | – |
| Italy | EUR293,000 | No host data available | – |
| Latvia | EUR11,472 | EUR581 | 5.1 |
| Lithuania | LTL 42,790 | LTL 1,611 | 3.8 |
| Luxembourg (2011) | EUR81,724 | No host data available | – |
| Malta (2012) | EUR12,356 | EUR13 | 0.1 |
| Netherlands | EUR497,677 | No host data available | – |
| Poland (2012) | PLN 728,749 | PLN 2,092 | 0.3 |
| Portugal | EUR93,168 | EUR62 | 0.1 |
| Romania (2012) | EUR59,126 | EUR79 | 0.1 |
| Slovakia | EUR42,660 | No host data available | – |
| Slovenia | EUR10,729 | EUR49 | 0.5 |
| Spain | EUR519,175 | EUR350 | 0.1 |
| Sweden (2012) | SEK 2 360,000 | No host data available | – |
| UK | GBP 936,452 | GBP 1,218 | 0.1 |

EUR 1 = DKK 7.45; GBP 0.80; LTL 3.45; PLN 4.21; SEK 9.20; USD 1.27 (European Central Bank 15.10.2014).

Note: National statistics of a host country sometimes differ significantly from the Russian source, stressing the importance of conducting a mirror study.

Source: Liuhto and Majuri (2014).

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